MONTAA

Montaa // Decision intelligencePre-launch · design partners wanted

Stress-test the decision before you make it.

For the rare, multi-party calls you only get once — a funding round, an acquisition, a negotiation. Montaa models the other side's incentives and unknowns, plays out how it could go, and shows which move holds up best and what would change the answer.

See how it works
Multi-party equilibrium analysisThousands of simulated futuresAssumptions you can see and editRanges, not false precision

01The problem

Your highest-stakes decisions are being made on intuition.

Every big decision involves other actors with their own goals, private information and moves still to come. Intuition can't hold all of that at once, and one wrong call can cost a deal, a company or a decade.

Montaa doesn't predict the future. It puts your assumptions on the table, plays them out against the other side, and shows which moves still hold up when you're wrong.

02How it works

Describe the situation. Montaa stress-tests it.

  1. 01

    Describe

    Write the decision in plain language: who is involved, what each party wants, the options on the table, what's at stake, what you already know.

  2. 02

    Model

    Montaa turns your brief into a formal game — players, information, preferences, moves, hidden unknowns — and lists every assumption it made so you can correct it.

  3. 03

    Simulate

    Tens of thousands of rollouts play out every branch across your uncertainty ranges — including counterparts who adapt, bluff, and misjudge.

  4. 04

    Decide

    Get the move that holds up best across scenarios, shown as ranges with the trade-offs, the risks, and what would change the answer.

montaa // session 0417● illustrative · not a forecast

Scenario

Weighing an acquisition. Target board is split, an activist investor holds a stake, a rival bidder may emerge, and the regulator timeline is uncertain.

Model

players: 4 + 1 inferred · info: incomplete · stages: 5

rollouts: 50,000 · solver: Bayesian NE + CFR

input confidence: low–medium · 6 of 9 inputs are your estimates

Recommended next move

Take a minority stake now; keep the option to acquire.

OptionOutcome rangeBad case
Stage in via minority stake0.50 – 0.75−0.25 – −0.05
Acquire now0.40 – 0.75−0.60 – −0.25
Wait six months0.25 – 0.60−0.35 – −0.10
Pass0.10 – 0.30−0.10 – 0.00

Ranked by how well each option holds up across assumptions, not by a point estimate.

03Capabilities

Four things your instincts can't compute.

01 / 04

Stakeholder dynamics

Who really wins when anyone moves.

Big decisions are rarely two-sided. Montaa models every party's utility and maps how value flows between them as positions shift — so you see the decision as a system, not a standoff.

  • +N-party payoff and utility modelling
  • +Coalition formation and defection analysis
  • +Stable-outcome detection via equilibrium search
+4−2+1−3+50ABCDNET VALUE TRANSFER · Δ UTILITY / PARTY

02 / 04

Trade-off frontier

Every concession has a price. See it.

Instead of one 'best' answer, Montaa charts the full frontier of achievable outcomes and shows what you give up — in gain, speed and durability — for each step along it.

  • +Pareto-efficient option mapping
  • +Fairness-aware solutions (Nash, Kalai–Smorodinsky)
  • +Concession sequencing, not just end states
BALANCED · MIN-REGRETYOUR GAIN →DEAL DURABILITY →

03 / 04

Risk assessment

Know the bad day before it arrives.

Thousands of simulated futures turn gut-feel risk into a range of outcomes, not a single number. See the median, the tail, and which of your moves fatten or thin it.

  • +Monte Carlo outcome distributions
  • +Tail-risk and walk-away (BATNA) stress tests
  • +Minimax-regret recommendations under uncertainty
P5 · TAILP50WORSE ← OUTCOME → BETTER10,000 ROLLOUTS

04 / 04

Hidden actors

The party not at the table still votes.

Boards, regulators, investors, rival bidders: influence that never appears on the invite. Montaa estimates how likely hidden actors are from observed behaviour and tests every scenario with and without them.

  • +Bayesian belief updating on private information
  • +Latent-influence detection from observed moves
  • +Scenarios with and without the unseen actor
ABCD?INFERRED INFLUENCELIKELIHOOD: HIGH (ESTIMATE)

04Under the hood

Seventy years of game theory, applied to your next big decision.

Montaa combines classical solution concepts with modern simulation and self-play methods — the same families of techniques used in economics, auction design, and superhuman game-playing AI.

Nash equilibrium

uᵢ(sᵢ*, s₋ᵢ*) ≥ uᵢ(sᵢ, s₋ᵢ*)

Find stable outcomes where no party gains by unilaterally changing course.

Bayesian Nash equilibrium

σᵢ(θᵢ) ∈ argmax E[uᵢ | θᵢ]

Reason about what others privately know, believe, and are hiding.

Subgame-perfect equilibrium

backward induction on the move tree

Discard empty threats; keep only commitments that stay credible at every stage.

Nash bargaining solution

max Πᵢ (uᵢ − dᵢ)

The principled split of surplus relative to each side's walk-away point.

Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

uᵢ − dᵢ ∝ maxᵢ − dᵢ

A fairness benchmark proportional to what each side could ideally achieve.

Shapley value

φᵢ = Σ |S|!(n−|S|−1)!/n! · [v(S∪i) − v(S)]

Attribute value to each party by their average marginal contribution to every coalition.

The Core

Σᵢ∈S xᵢ ≥ v(S) ∀ S ⊆ N

Test whether any sub-group could profitably walk away and break the deal apart.

Monte Carlo simulation

E[U] ≈ (1/N) Σₖ U(ωₖ)

Sample thousands of futures to estimate expected value, variance and tail risk.

Monte Carlo tree search

UCT = X̄ᵢ + c√(ln N / nᵢ)

Efficiently explore deep move sequences, focusing compute where it matters.

Counterfactual regret minimization

σ ← regret-matching(Rᵀ)

Self-play to converge on robust strategies in games with hidden information.

Quantal response equilibrium

P(a) ∝ exp(λ·u(a))

Model real counterparts as noisy and boundedly rational, not perfect calculators.

Minimax regret

min_a max_ω [ u*(ω) − u(a, ω) ]

Choose the action you'll least regret across the scenarios you can't rule out.

Grounded in the literature

Nash (1950), The Bargaining Problem · Harsanyi (1967–68), Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players · Shapley (1953), A Value for n-Person Games · Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975), Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem · McKelvey & Palfrey (1995), Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games · Kocsis & Szepesvári (2006), Bandit Based Monte-Carlo Planning · Zinkevich et al. (2007), Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information

05Honest by design

A stress test for your thinking, not a prediction.

Every model of a live deal rests on estimates — yours and ours — and Montaa won't dress them up as certainty. Outputs are ranges. Every assumption is visible and editable. And you're told which assumption would flip the recommendation, so you can challenge it before you act on it.

Decision trace · illustrative

Recommendation

Take a minority stake now; keep the option to acquire.

Because

In most rollouts where a rival bidder emerges, buying outright at today's price overpays; a staged entry holds up better.

Assuming

Board stays split · regulator review ≥ 90 days · rival has not yet valued the asset.

Breaks if

The target accelerates a competing process. Re-run recommended.

Flips if

The activist's exit price is ~15% lower than assumed: 'Acquire now' then ranks first.

Confidence

Low–medium. 6 of 9 inputs are your estimates. Treat the ranking as a stress test, not a forecast.

06Who it's for

Built for the rare, multi-party calls.

Founders raising a round

Lead and follow-on dynamics, terms versus dilution, and who signals whom.

M&A and corp-dev advisors

Bidder behaviour, board and activist dynamics, and the sequencing of your next move.

VC and PE deal teams

Competitive processes, syndicate dynamics and when to push or walk.

Strategy consultants

Pressure-test a client's recommendation against how rivals and stakeholders will react.

Negotiation and deal lawyers

Concession sequencing and walk-away points across several parties.

Executives facing a one-off bet

An acquisition, a market entry or a pricing move where rivals and boards respond.

Help shape Montaa.

Montaa is in development. We're inviting a small group of founders, deal teams and advisors facing a live decision to shape it and get first access.

This form asks for no deal details, so please don't include confidential information. See our privacy note. Montaa is decision support, not financial or legal advice.

Pre-launch · all figures on this page are illustrative · no customer results yet